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Abstract
In this paper, we study the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem of non-cooperative games in dynamic
environments. Each player in the game aims to minimize its own time-varying cost function subject to a local action set. The
action sets of all players are coupled through a shared convex inequality constraint. Each player can only have access to its own
cost function, its own set constraint and a local block of the inequality constraint, and can only communicate with its neighbours
via a connected graph. Moreover, players do not have prior knowledge of their future cost functions. To address this problem, an
online distributed algorithm is proposed based on consensus algorithms and a primal-dual strategy. Performance of the algorithm
is measured by using dynamic regrets. Under mild assumptions on graphs and cost functions, we prove that if the deviation of
variational generalized Nash equilibrium sequence increases within a certain rate, then the regrets, as well as the violation of
inequality constraint, grow sublinearly. A simulation is presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of our theoretical results.
Index Terms
Nash equilibrium; online algorithm, distributed algorithm; consensus; non-cooperative game.
I. INTRODUCTION
N
ASH equilibrium (NE) seeking and generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) seeking in non-cooperative games have received
increasing attention in recent years. This is due to their wide practical applications in large-scale systems including sensor
networks [1], distributed power systems [2], and social networks [3].
Recently, distributed NEs or GNEs seeking in non-cooperative games without full action information have been considered
[5]-[9], [12]-[16]. In such problems, players cannot directly observe actions of players who are not their neighbors, but they
can make decisions based on local estimations on actions of the others. In [5] and [6], asynchronous gossip-based algorithms
are presented for seeking an NE. In [7] and [8], continuous-time distributed NE seeking strategies are proposed by combining
consensus algorithms and the gradient strategy. In [9], an augmented gradient play dynamics is proposed by exploiting some
incremental passivity properties of the pseudo-gradient mapping. In applications where players compete for shared network
resources, shared constraints that couple players’ actions together usually appear [2], [4]. In [10], [11], semi-decentralized
algorithms are proposed for seeking GNEs of aggregative games with shared coupling constraints, where a central coordinator
is required to broadcast the common multipliers and aggregative variables. In [12], a distributed prime-dual strategy using
partial decision information is designed for searching a GNE in aggregate games with a shared linear equation constraint. In
[13], [14], for general non-cooperative games with shared linear constraints, a distributed algorithm via an operator-splitting
approach is proposed for seeking the GNE under partial decision information, and the asynchronous operator-splitting algorithm
is studied in [15]. Moreover, for non-cooperative games without full decision information, a continuous-time distributed gradient
projected algorithm is presented for seeking the GNE in [16].
If cost functions in a game are time-varying and they are only available to players after decisions are made, then the game
is called an online game. Accordingly, an algorithm for dealing with such a game is referred to as an online algorithm or a
learning algorithm. It is obvious that all of the aforementioned works consider offline games, and strategies in them are offline
algorithms. However, dynamic environments arise in many practical applications. For example, in the problem of allocating
radio resources, due to the uncertainties in dynamic wireless environment, cost functions in the game is time-varying, sometimes
changes can only be seen in hindsight [17]. To adapt to such dynamic environments, it is necessary to develop online strategies.
It is well-known that any online algorithm should mimic the performance of its offline counterpart, and the gap between them
is the regret. For instance, in online optimization problems [18]-[20], the most stringent offline benchmark is to minimize the
cost function at each time. The corresponding regret is called as dynamic regret. Using dynamic regrets, online optimization
problems become insolvable in the worst case when cost functions fluctuate drastically. The difficulty can be characterized via
a complexity measure that captures the variation in the optimal solution sequence [18]. Different from optimization problems,
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2since each player aims to minimize its own cost function, and each player’s cost function depends on actions of the others,
then NEs or GNEs are sub-optimal solutions in non-cooperative games.
Motivated by the observations above, in this paper, the online distributed GNE seeking problem in non-cooperative games
without full action information is studied. Different from works [5]-[15], players’ cost functions are dynamic, and changes
can only be seen by players after decisions are made. The offline benchmark for each player is to selfishly minimize its
own cost function at each time. Moreover, the shared constraint is modeled as a set of nonlinear convex inequalities, which
is more general than those in [12]-[15]. To address this problem, a novel online distributed algorithm is presented based on
consensus algorithms and a primal-dual algorithm. Due to the existence of nonlinear constraints, the Lagrange multiplier and the
argument are coupled in the primal-dual algorithm. This brings challenges to achieving a sublinear regret bound. To overcome
this difficulty, a slowly decaying learning rate is employed for ensuring the product of itself and local Lagrange multipliers to
be bounded. By implementing the proposed algorithm, each player makes decisions only using its own cost function, a local
set constraint, a local block of the convex inequality constraint, a local estimation on actions of the others, and actions received
from its neighbors. We prove that if the graph is connected, then both the regrets and the violation of inequality constraint are
bounded by product of a term depending on the deviation of variational GNE sequence and a sublinear function of learning
time.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formulate the problem and present the online distributed GNE seeking
algorithm. In Section III, we state our main result and give its proof. In Section IV, a simulation example is presented. Section
V concludes the whole paper.
Notations. We use N+ to denote the set of positive integers. For any T ∈ N+, we denote set ⌊T ⌋ = {1, · · · , T }. Rm and
R
r
+ denote m-dimensional real vector space and r-dimensional non-negative real vector space, respectively. We use O(h) to
denote a general function that is linear with respect to h. For a given vector x ∈ Rm, ‖x‖ denotes the standard Euclidean
norm of x, i.e., ‖x‖ =
√
xTx. 1m denotes the m-dimensional vector with elements being all ones. For a ∈ R, we denote
a+ = max(a, 0). For vector x ∈ Rm, we denote x+ = [x1+, · · · , xm+ ]T . Given a differentiable function f(·) : Rm → R, we
use ∇xf(·) to denote its gradient. For matrices A and B, the Kronecker product is denoted by A ⊗ B. λi(A) represents the
ith eigenvalue of square matrix A. The projection onto a set K is denoted by PK(·).
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Online GNE seeking problem
A game with n players is denoted by Γ(V , χ, J). V = {1, · · · , n} represents the set of players; χ = χ1 × · · · × χn denotes
the action set of players, where χi ⊂ Rm is the action set of player i; J = (J1, · · · , Jn), where Ji is the cost function of
player i; Let x = (xi, x−i) denote all players’ actions, where xi is the action of player i and x−i denotes actions of players
other than player i, i.e., x−i = [xT1 , · · · , xTi−1, xTi+1, · · · , xTn ]T . For game Γ(V , χ, J), an action profile x∗ = (x∗i , x∗−i) is called
the NE of this game if and only if Ji(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) ≤ Ji(xi, x∗−i) holds for any xi ∈ χi and i ∈ V . Moreover, if χi is determined
by actions of the other players, then the NE is referred to be a GNE.
Here we consider an online game Γ(V , χ, J t), where J t = (J t1, · · · , J tn). We denote the constraint by χ := χs ∩ (Ω1 ×
· · · × Ωn), where χs is the shared constraint χs = {x ∈ Rnm|
∑n
i=1 gi(xi) ≤ 0}, and gi(·) : Rm → Rr can be nonlinear for
any i ∈ V and is defined as gi = [gi1, · · · , gir]T , Ωi ⊂ Rm represents player i’s private constraint. Then, player i’s action
set is denoted by χi(x−i) = {xi|(xi, x−i) ∈ χ}. For player i ∈ V , a set of cost functions are given by
{
J1i , · · · , JTi
}
, where
J ti : R
m → R, T ∈ N+ represents the learning time and is unknown to players. At each iteration time t ∈ ⌊T ⌋, player i
decides an action xi(t) ∈ Ωi under an online algorithm. After the action xi(t) is decided, a local cost function J ti is received
by player i, that is, information associated with cost functions is not available before decisions are made by palyers. In this
scenario, for any t ∈ ⌊T ⌋, each player intends to solve the optimization problem
min
xi
J ti (xi, x−i)
subject to xi ∈ χi(x−i).
(1)
Define a pseudo-gradient mapping F t(x) = [(∇x1J1t(x))T , · · · , (∇xnJnt(x))T ]T , some basic assumptions on the cost
functions, which are also made in [5], [16], [15], are given as follows.
Assumption 1: For i ∈ V , Ωi ∈ Rm is a non-empty, compact and convex set; J ti (xi, x−i) is differentiable and convex with
respect to xi for any x−i ∈ R(n−1)m; gij(y), j = 1, · · · , r are convex and differentiable for any y ∈ Rm ; The action set χ
is non-empty.
Assumption 2: (i) (Strong monotonicity) (F t(x)− F t(y))T (x −y) ≥ µ‖x− y‖2, ∀ x, y ∈ Ω for some µ > 0;
(ii) (Lipschitz continuity) ‖∇xiJ ti (xi, w)−∇xiJ ti (xi, z)‖ ≤ ℓ‖w − z‖ for some ℓ > 0, ∀ xi ∈ Ωi; w, z ∈ Rm, i ∈ V .
Under Assumption 1, we know that Ωi is convex and compact. Then, for any i ∈ V and xi ∈ Ωi, ‖xi‖, ‖gi(xi)‖, ‖∇xiJ ti (x)‖
and ‖∇xigi(xi)‖ are bounded, and we denote

κ1 = sup
x∈Ωi
‖xi‖, κ2 = sup
x∈Ωi
‖gi(xi)‖,
κ3 = sup
x∈Ω
‖∇xiJ ti (x)‖, κ0 = sup
xi∈Ωi
‖∇xigi(xi)‖
∀i ∈ V . (2)
3Note that set χ is convex and compact. Together with the convexity and differentiability of cost functions, by Theorem 3.9
in [26], we know that for any t ∈ ⌊T ⌋, every solution x∗(t) ∈ χ to the following variational inequality is a GNE of game
Γ(V , χ, J t): (
F t(x∗(t))
)T
(x− x∗(t)) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ χ. (3)
The solution x∗(t) ∈ χ in (3) is called a variational GNE. Moreover, by the strong monotonicity condition in Assumption 2,
it follows from Theorem 2. 3. 3 in [27] that variational inequality (3) has a unique solution. Accordingly, Assumptions 1 and
2 ensure existence and uniqueness of the variational GNE. Currently, it is rather difficult to seek all GNEs even if the game is
offline. Since the variational GNE has the economic interpretation of no price discrimination and enjoys good stability, seeking
the variational GNE is the main goal in the study of games with shared constraints [12]-[15]. Given some γ(t) > 0, based
on variational inequality (3), define a Lagrange function Lt(x, y) = γ(t)
(∑n
i=1 J
t
i (xi, x
∗
−i(t)) + γ(t)y
T
(∑n
j=1,j 6=i gj(x
∗
j (t))
+gi(xi)
))
, where x ∈ Ω, y ∈ Rm+ , and x∗(t) = (x∗i (t), x∗−i(t)) is the variational GNE of game Γ(V , χ, J t). Using primal-dual
theory [14], [16], [26] and by the fact that x∗i (t) = PΩi [x
∗
i (t)], we know that for any γ(t) ≥ 0, there exists a bounded Lagrange
multiplier y∗(t) ∈ Rm+ such that the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition (KKT condition)

x∗i (t) = PΩi [x
∗
i (t)− γ(t)(∇xiJ ti (x∗i (t), x∗−i(t)) + γ(t)∇xigi(x∗i (t))y∗(t))]
y∗(t) =
[
y∗(t) +
n∑
i=1
gi(x
∗
i (t))
]
+
∀i ∈ V (4)
where ∇xigi(·) = [∇xigi1(·), · · · , ∇xigir(·)].
Any learning or online algorithm should mimic the performance of its offline counterpart, and the gap between them is
regret. Here the offline benchmark for each player is to minimize its own cost function at each time. By the definition of
GNEs, we know that (x∗i (t), x
∗
−i(t)) is a GNE of (1) if and only if x
∗
i (t) is the solution to the following optimization
min
xi
J ti (xi, x
∗
−i(t))
subject to xi ∈ χi(x∗−i(t))
(5)
for any i ∈ V . Based on (5) and motivated by [18], the regret is defined as follows
Ri(T ) =
T∑
t=1
(
J ti (xi(t), x
∗
−i(t))− J ti (x∗(t))
)
, i ∈ V (6)
where x∗(t) = (x∗i (t), x
∗
−i(t)) is the variational GNE satisfying (4) at iteration time t. Accordingly, the violation of the
inequality constraint is defined as
Rg(T ) =
∥∥∥∥∥
[
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
gi(xi(t))
]
+
∥∥∥∥∥ . (7)
An online algorithm performs well if both (6) and (7) sublinearly increase, i.e., limT→∞Ri(T )/T = 0 and limT→∞Rg(T )/T
= 0. However, if the variational GNE sequence {x∗(t)}Tt=0 fluctuate drastically, it could be impossible to keep dynamic regrets
sublinear. Motivated by [18]-[20], we use the following deviation of the GNE sequence {x∗(t)}Tt=0 to describe the difficulty:
ΘT =
T∑
t=0
‖x∗(t+ 1)− x∗(t)‖. (8)
Problem 1: In game Γ(V , χ, J t), Ji may be depended on actions of players who are not player i’s neighbors. Suppose that
player i can only communicate with its neighbors via communication graph G(A), and has access to the information associated
with Ji, Ωi, gi for any i ∈ V . The goal of this paper is to design an online distributed algorithm for the players to seek
variational GNEs of the game Γ(V , χ, J t), and performance of the algorithm is measured by using regret (6) and violation (7).
Remark 1: If each cost function J ti is fixed to be Ji, and gi(xi) = [(Aixi − bi)T ,−(Aixi − bi)T ]T for some matrix Ai
and vector bi with suitable dimension, then Problem 1 is reduced to be an offline GNE seeking problem studied in [12], [15].
Different from them, we investigate the case where cost functions are dynamic and the constraints are nonlinear.
4B. An online distributed algorithm for GNEs
Before presenting our algorithm, we denote the communication graph by an undirected graph G(A), where A = (aij)n×n
represents the weighted matrix. In G(A), the set of player i’s neighbors is denoted by Ni. If j ∈ Ni, then aij = aji > 0;
Otherwise, aij = aji = 0. Moreover, the following connectivity assumption associated with graph G(A) is presented.
Assumption 3: G(A) is connected. Moreover, 0 < aii < 1 for any i ∈ V and A1n = 1n.
We use A−i to denote a submatrix that is formed by removing the ith row and the ith column of weighted matrix A. Define
matrix Λi = diag(a1i, · · · , a(i−1)i, a(i+1)i, · · · , a(n)i), it is obvious that A−i = (A−i )T and ((In−1 − A−i ) − Λi)1n−1 = 0.
Under Assumption 3, we know that there exists a path from node i to any other one. Based on Lemma 3 in [21], we know
that In−1 − A−i is positive definite, which implies that λk(A−i ) < 1. Using Gerschgorin’s disk theorem and the fact that
0 < aii < 1, it is not difficult to verify that λk(A
−
i ) > −1 Thus, −1 < λk(A−i ) < 1 for any k = 1, · · · , n− 1. Throughout
this paper, we denote
λ = max
1≤i≤n,1≤k≤n−1
∣∣λk(A−i )∣∣ . (9)
It is obvious that 0 < λ < 1. Furthermore, for symmetric and stochastic matrix A, its singular values can be sorted in a
non-increasing fashion
1 = σ1(A) ≥ σ2(A) ≥ · · · ≥ σn(A) ≥ 0. (10)
Under Assumption 3, one knows that 0 < σ2(A) < 1 [28].
Let vector x−i = [xTi1, · · · , xTi(i−1), xTi(i+1), · · · , xTin]T denote player i’s estimates on all the players’ actions but its own’s,
where xij is the player i’s estimate on player j’s action. For ease, we denote xi = [x
T
i1, · · · , xTin]T , where xii = xi denote
player i’s real action. To solve Problem 1, we propose the following algorithm for player i, i ∈ V :

xih(t+ 1) =
∑
k∈Ni/{h}
aikxkh(t) + aihxh(t), h 6= i
xi(t+ 1) = (1− γ(t))xi(t) + γ(t)PΩi
[
xi(t)− γ(t)(∇xiJ ti (xi(t)) + γ(t)∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t))
]
yi(t+ 1) =
[
(1− γ2(t))
∑
j∈Ni
aijyj(t) + γ(t)gi(xi(t))
]
+
(11)
where yi ∈ Rr is player i’s estimate on the Lagrange multiplier, γ(t) is a non-increasing learning rate such that 0 ≤ γ(t) ≤ 1,
and the initial states are chosen as xi(1) ∈ Ωi, yi(1) = 0, xih(1) = 0 for any i 6= h. In algorithm (11), each player updates
estimates on actions of others by a leader-following consensus algorithm [21]; Player i updates xi(t) and yi(t) by using a
distributed primal-dual strategy, which is motivated by the consensus algorithm [22], [24] and the primal-dual strategy [25].
Note that players make decisions only using local state information and their own cost functions in the past time, thus, algorithm
(11) is online and distributed.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we state our main result and give its proof in detail.
Theorem 1: Under Assumptions 1-3, by algorithm (11), regrets (6) and violation (7) are bounded by
Ri(T ) ≤ O


√√√√T
(
ΘT + 1
γ2(T )
+
T∑
t=1
γ(t)
)
 , i ∈ V (12)
and
Rg(T ) ≤ O


√(
ΘT+1
γ2(T ) +
∑T
t=1 γ(t)
)(
1 +
∑T
t=1 γ
2(t)
)
γ(T )

 (13)
where ΘT is defined in (8).
Results in Theorem 1 indicate that the sublinearity of bounds in (12) and (13) is determined by ΘT and γ(t). If we set
the learning rate to be fixed by selecting γ(t) = C for some C > 0, then both of bounds in (12) and (13) are equivalent to
O
(√
T (T +ΘT )
)
, which do not increase sublinearly. To keep sublinearity of bounds in (12) and (13), diminishing learning
rate is necessary. Let diminishing learning rate be γ(t) = Cη(Dt+ C)−η for some C, D > 0 and 0 < η < 12 , we have
5T∑
t=1
γ(t) =
T∑
t=1
Cη(Dt+ C)−η
≤ 1 +
∫ T
0
Cη(Dt+ C)−ηdt
≤ O (T 1−η)
and
T∑
t=1
γ2(t) =
T∑
t=1
C−2η(Dt+ C)−2η ≤ O (T 1−2η) .
Then, based on Theorem 1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1: Under Assumptions 1-3, if the learning rate is given as γ(t) = Cη(Dt+ C)−η for some C, D > 0 and
0 < η < 12 , then by algorithm (11), regrets (6) and violation (7) are bounded by
Ri(T ) ≤ O
(
T
1
2
+η
(√
1 + ΘT + T
1−3η
2
))
, i ∈ V (14)
and
Rg(T ) ≤ O
(
T
1
2
+η
(√
1 + ΘT + T
1−3η
2
))
(15)
where ΘT is defined in (8).
In Corollary 1, it is obvious that terms T
1
2
+η and T
1
2
+η ·T 1−3η2 = T 1−η2 are sublinear with T due to the fact that 0 < η < 12 ,
then ΘT is a significant factor that influences the sublinearity of the bounds. Note that if the increasing rate of ΘT is sublinear
with T 1−2η, i.e., limT→∞ ΘTT 1−2η = 0, then limT→∞
T
1
2
+η√1+ΘT
T = 0, which implies that both Ri(T ) and Rg(T ) sublinearly
increase with T . In this case, online distributed algorithm (11) performs well. Particularly, let η = 14 , if the increasing rate
of ΘT is sublinear with
√
T , then both Ri(T ) and Rg(T ) sublinearly grow with T . If variational GNE sequence {x∗(t)}Tt=1
fluctuates drastically, ΘT could become linear with T
η, then the bounds in Theorem 1 cannot keep Ri(T ) and Rg(T ) sublinear.
This is natural since even in the optimization problems having globally optimal solutions [18]-[20], the problem is insolvable
in worst cases. Furthermore, if cost functions are time-invariant, and let J ti = Ji and x
∗(t) = (x∗i , x
∗
−i) for any i ∈ V ,
then ΘT = 0, and the game Γ(V , χ, J t) is reduced to be an offline case. By (14) and definitions of regrets in (6), there
holds limT→∞
∑
T
t=1
Ji(xi(t),x
∗
−i)
T − Ji(x∗) = 0. Replacing players’ actions with the average value defined x¯i(t) =
∑
t
k=1
xi(k)
t ,
and using convexity of Ji yield limt→∞ Ji(x¯i(t), x∗−i) − Ji(x∗) = 0, which implies that limt→∞ x¯i(t) = x∗i . Accordingly,
(x¯i(t), x¯−i(t)) asymptotically converges to the variational GNE. Thus, the methods and results are also applicable to the offline
cases studied in [5], [6], [12]-[16].
In what follows, some lemmas are provided to prove Theorem 1. First, the boundedness of ‖γ(t)yi(t)‖ is presented.
Lemma 1: Under Assumption 1, ‖γ(t)yi(t)‖ ≤ √nκ2 for any 2 ≤ t ≤ T and i ∈ V , where κ2 is defined in (2).
Proof: See APPENDIX. A.
Now we present the bound of the error between estimate on each player’s action and its real action, as well as a bound of
the error between each player’s estimate on the Lagrange multiplier and their average. Before going on, we denote the error
by eih(t) = xih(t)− xh(t) and ei = [eT1i, · · · , eT(i−1)i, eT(i+1)i, · · · , eTni]T .
Lemma 2: Under Assumptions 1 and 3, for any i ∈ V and 2 ≤ t ≤ T ,
(i) ‖ei(t)‖ ≤ λt−1‖ei(1)‖+ 2
√
n− 1κ1
∑t−2
k=0 λ
kγ(t− k − 1);
(ii) ‖ei(t)‖2 ≤ λt−1‖ei(1)‖2 + ρ
∑t−2
k=0 λ
kγ(t− k − 1);
(iii) ‖yi(t)− y¯(t)‖ ≤ 2(n+√n)κ2
∑t−2
k=0(σ2(A))
kγ(t− 1− k);
(iv) ‖yi(t)− y¯(t)‖2 ≤ ̺
∑t−2
k=0(σ2(A))
kγ(t− k − 1)
where y¯(t) = 1n
∑n
i=1 yi(t), ρ =
8(n−1)κ21
1−λ , ̺ =
4(n+
√
n)2κ22
1−σ2(A) , κ1 and κ2 are defined in (2), and λ and σ2(A) are defined in (9)
and (10), respectively.
Proof: See APPENDIX. B.
Note that limt→∞ λt−1 = 0. If γ(t) is diminishing, i.e., limt→∞ γ(t) = 0, then limt→∞
∑t−2
k=0 λ
kγ(t − k − 1) and
limt→∞
∑t−2
k=0(σ2(A))
kγ(t−k−1) = 0, accordingly, limt→∞ ‖ei(t)‖ = 0 and limt→∞ ‖yi(t)− y¯(t)‖ = 0, which implies that
each player can estimate real actions of others, and all yi(t), i = 1, · · · , n will approach to a common value as time evolves.
Next, we establish an upper bound of the accumulated square error between players’ actions and the GNE.
Lemma 3: Under Assumptions 2 and 1, let x(t) = (xi(t), x−i(t)),
6T∑
t=1
‖x(t)− x∗(t)‖2
≤ 2κ1
√
n
µγ2(T )
(ΘT + κ1
√
n) +
(1 + κ0)ℓ
2
2µ
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
‖ei(t)‖2
+
π1
µ
T∑
t=1
γ(t) +
π2
µ
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
‖ei(t)‖+ κ2
µ
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
‖yi(t)
− y¯(t)‖ − 1
µ
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
γ(t)(gi(xi(t)))
T yi(t)
(16)
where π1 = τ/2 +n
2(κ20 + κ0)κ
2
2 + 2κ0κ3κ2n
√
n+ nκ0θ
2, τ = 4nκ0θ(θκ0 + κ1 + κ3) + 4nκ
2
3, π2 = 2
√
n− 1ℓ(κ1 + κ3),
θ = supt∈⌊T⌋ ‖y∗(t)‖, κi, i = 0, · · · , 3 are defined in (2), and µ is the strong monotonicity parameter given in Assumption 1.
Proof: See APPENDIX. C.
Then, the lower bound of
∑T
t=1
∑n
i=1 γ(t)(gi(xi(t)))
T yi(t) in (16) is presented.
Lemma 4: Under Assumption 1, for any y ∈ Rr+,
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
γ(t)
(
(gi(xi(t)))
T yi(t)− (gi(xi(t)))T y
)
≥ −n
2
(
1 +
T∑
t=1
γ2(t)
)
‖y‖2 − 9
2
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
‖yi(t)− y¯(t)‖2
− nκ22(1 + n)
T∑
t=1
γ(t)− 2κ2(1 +
√
n)
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
‖yi(t)− y¯(t)‖.
(17)
Proof: See APPENDIX. D.
Now, we can present the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Letting γ(t) = c3√dt+c , we have
T∑
t=2
t−2∑
k=0
λkγ(t− k − 1) =
T−2∑
k=0
λk
T−k−1∑
t=1
γ(t) ≤ O
(
T∑
t=1
γ(t)
)
where the equation holds by changing the order of summations. Similarly,
∑T
t=2
∑t−2
k=0(σ(A))
kγ(t−k−1) ≤ O
(∑T
t=1 γ(t)
)
.
By in Lemma 2, we have 

T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
‖ei(t)‖ ≤ O
(
T∑
t=1
γ(t)
)
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
‖ei(t)‖2 ≤ O
(
T∑
t=1
γ(t)
)
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
‖yi(t)− y¯(t)‖ ≤ O
(
T∑
t=1
γ(t)
)
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
‖yi(t)− y¯(t)‖2 ≤ O
(
T∑
t=1
γ(t)
)
.
(18)
From Lemma 1, we know that ‖γ(t)yi(t)‖ ≤ √nκ2. Submitting (18) into (16) in Lemma 3 yields
T∑
t=1
‖x(t)− x∗(t)‖2 + 1
µ
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
γ(t)(gi(xi(t)))
T yi(t) ≤ O
(
ΘT + 1
γ2(T )
+
T∑
t=1
γ(t)
)
. (19)
Furthermore, submitting (18) into (17) in Lemma 4 yields
−
T∑
t=1
γ(t)
n∑
i=1
(gi(xi(t)))
T yi(t) +
T∑
t=1
γ(t)
n∑
i=1
(
gi(xi(t))
)T
y − n
2
(
1 +
T∑
t=1
γ2(t)
)
‖y‖2 ≤ O
(
T∑
t=1
γ(t)
)
(20)
7for any y ∈ Rr+. Combining (19) and (20) results in that
T∑
t=1
‖x(t)− x∗(t)‖2 + 1
µ
T∑
t=1
γ(t)
n∑
i=1
(gi(xi(t)))
T y
− n
2µ
(
1 +
T∑
t=1
γ2(t)
)
‖y‖2 ≤ O
(
ΘT + 1
γ2(T )
+
T∑
t=1
γ(t)
)
.
(21)
Note that ‖J ti (xi(t), x∗−i(t))− J ti (x∗(t))‖ ≤ κ3‖xi(t)− x∗i (t)‖. Thus,
Ri(T ) ≤ κ3
T∑
t=1
‖xi(t)− x∗i (t)‖
≤ κ3
√√√√T T∑
t=1
‖x(t)− x∗(t)‖2.
(22)
Letting y in inequality (21) be 0, we have
∑T
t=1 ‖x(t)−x∗(t)‖2 ≤ O
(
ΘT+1
γ2(T ) +
∑T
t=1 γ(t)
)
. Together with (22), it immediately
implies inequality (12).
Furthermore, due to the arbitrariness of y ∈ Rm+ , letting
y =
[∑T
t=1 γ(t)
∑n
i=1 gi(xi(t))
]
+
n
(
1 +
∑T
t=1 γ
2(t)
)
one has (
T∑
t=1
γ(t)
n∑
i=1
gi(xi(t))
)T
y − n
2
(
1 +
T∑
t=1
γ2(t)
)
‖y‖2
=
[∑T
t=1 γ(t)
∑n
i=1 gi(xi(t))
]2
+
2n
(
1 +
∑T
t=1 γ
2(t)
)
≥ (γ(T )Rg(t))
2
2n
(
1 +
∑T
t=1 γ
2(t)
) .
Together with (21), it follows
γ2(T )(Rg(t))2 ≤ O
((
ΘT
γ2(T )
+
T∑
t=1
γ(t)
)(
1 +
T∑
t=1
γ2(t)
))
. (23)
Inequality (23) implies inequality (13). This completes the proof. 
IV. A SIMULATION EXAMPLE
In this section, we illustrate the achieved results by using our algorithm to deal with an online Nash-Cournot game Γ(V , χ, J t)
with production constraints and market capacity constraints. In the Nash-Cournot game, there exist five firms (players) that
produce same production, and these firms are labeled by index set V = {1, · · · , 5}. The firms communicate with each other via
a connected graph G(A) shown in Fig. 1, where each element of weighted matrix A = (aij)n×n is set to be aij = 1|Ni| , and |Ni|
is the element number in Ni. Let the quantity produced by firm i be xi ∈ R. Due to existence of some changeable factors such
as marginal costs, the production cost and the demand price could be time-varying [29]. The production cost and the demand
price of firm i are given by pti(xi) = αi(t)xi and d
t
i(x) = βi(t)−
∑5
j=1 xj , respectively, where αi(t), βi(t) > 0 and t ∈ [0, T ].
Then, based on formulations in [29] and [30], the overall cost function of firm i follows that J ti (xi, x−i) = p
t
i(xi)− xidti(x)
for any t ∈ [0, T ] and i ∈ V . Moreover, the production constraint of each firm is given by Ωi ⊂ R, and the market capacity
constraint is given by shared inequality constraint
∑5
i=1 xi ≤
∑5
i=1 li. To achieve maximum benefit, each firm aims to minimize
its own cost function J ti (xi, x−i).
In this formulation, we set T = 300, αi(t) = sin(t/12), βi(t) = 45 + 5i − 0.5i sin(t/12), l1 = 10, l2 = l5 = 15,
l3 = 8, l4 = 8 and Ωi = {x|0 ≤ x ≤ 30}, i ∈ V . In the offline setting, we denote the GNE of game Γ(V , χ, J t) by
x∗(t) = [x∗1(t), · · · , x∗n(t)]T . At each iteration time, x∗i (t) approximates to PΩi (ξi), where ξi = 8 sin(t/12)3 − 5 + 5i. Now
suppose that player i can only have access to J t−1i , li,Ωi and its neighbors’ actions. Algorithm (11) is applied to the problem.
Initial values are given by x1(0) = 0, x2(0) = x5(0) = 30, x3(0) = x4(0) = 10, xij(0) = 10 and yi(0) = 1, i, j ∈ V , and the
8Fig. 1. Communication graph G(A).
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Fig. 2. The trajectories of players’ actions xi(t), i = 1, · · · , 5.
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Fig. 3. The trajectory of Ri(t)/t, i = 1, · · · , 5.
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Fig. 4. The trajectory of Rg(t)/t
learning rate is set to be that γ(t) = 3
√
6
0.1t+6 . Fig. 2 shows the trajectories of players’ real actions. The trajectories of average
regrets Ri(t)/t, i ∈ V and average violation Rg(t)/t are shown in Fig. 3 and in Fig. 4, respectively. From Fig. 3 and Fig. 4,
we see that both Ri(t)/t and Rg(t)/t approximately decay to zero after a period of time, which implies that both the regret
and the violation of inequality constraint sublinearly increase. These observations are consistent with the results established in
Theorem 1.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, an online distributed primal-dual algorithm has been presented for players to seek GNEs of non-cooperative
games with dynamic cost functions, where all action sets are coupled through shared convex inequality constraints. By
implementing the algorithm, each player makes decisions only using its own cost function, local set constraint, a local block
of the convex inequality constraint, and actions and estimates received from its neighbors. The result shows that if the graph
is connected, then the regrets, as well as the violation of inequality constraint, is bounded by product of a term depending on
the deviation of variational GNE sequence and a sublinear function of learning time. A simulation example has been presented
to demonstrate the effectiveness of our theoretical results. How to achieve lower bounds of the regrets and the violation is a
difficult problem in online non-cooperative games with shared inequality constraints. This topic will be considered in our future
work. Our future work will also focus on some other interesting topics, such as the case with time delays and communication
bandwidth constraints, which will bring new challenges in online distributed GNE seeking.
VI. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Considering the norm of the third equation in (11) and using the fact that
∑n
j=1 aij =
∑n
i=1 aij = 1, we have
9n∑
i=1
‖yi(t+ 1)‖2
≤
n∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
j=1
aij((1 − γ2(t))yj(t) + γ(t)gi(xi(t)))
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
n∑
i=1

 n∑
j=1
aij
∥∥∥∥(1− γ2(t))yj(t) + γ2(t)gi(xi(t))γ(t)
∥∥∥∥


2
≤
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aij
(
(1− γ2(t))‖yj(t)‖2 + ‖gi(xi(t))‖2
)
≤ (1 − γ2(t))
n∑
i=1
‖yi(t)‖2 + nκ22
where the first inequality holds due to the non-expansive property of projection, the second inequality results from triangle
inequality, and the third inequality holds by using Jensen’s inequality. Because yi(1) = 0, γ
2(t) ≤ 1 and γ(t) ≤ γ(t− 1), it
yields that
∑n
i=1 ‖yi(2)‖2 ≤ nκ
2
2
γ2(1) ;
∑n
i=1 ‖yi(3)‖2 ≤ (1−γ2(2))
∑n
i=1 ‖yi(2)‖2+nκ22 ≤ nκ
2
2
γ2(2) . In a similar fashion, we have∑n
i=1 ‖yi(t)‖2 ≤ nκ
2
2
γ2(t−1) for any t ∈ ⌊T ⌋. By the fact that γ(t) is non-increasing, it leads to the validity of the result. 
B. Proof of Lemma 2
(i) By the first equation in (11), we have
eih(t+ 1) =
∑
k∈Ni/{h}
aikekh(t)− (xh(t+ 1)− xh(t)) (24)
for any i, h ∈ V . Let ωh(t) = xh(t)− xh(t+ 1), by (24), we have
eh(t+ 1) = (A
−
h ⊗ Im)eh(t) + νh(t) h ∈ V (25)
where νh(t) = (1n−1⊗ Im)ωh(t). By the second equation in (11) and using the compactness of Ωh in Assumption 2, we have
‖ωh(t)‖ ≤ 2γ(t)κ1 for any h ∈ V . By (25), taking the norm of eh and replacing label h with label i, we have
‖ei(t+ 1)‖ ≤ λ‖ei(t)‖ + 2
√
n− 1κ1γ(t) i ∈ V
which immediately leads to the validity of (i).
(ii) By the facts that xh(1) ∈ Ωh and xih(1) = 0 for any i 6= h, we know that ‖ei(1)‖ ≤
√
n− 1κ1 for any i ∈ V . Hence,
‖ei(t)‖2 ≤ λt−1‖ei(1)‖2 + 4(n− 1)κ21
t−2∑
k=0
λkγ(t− k − 1) + 4(n− 1)κ21
(
t−2∑
k=0
λkγ(t− k − 1)
)2
Using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality yields(
t−2∑
k=0
λkγ(t− k − 1)
)2
≤
(
t−2∑
k=0
λk
)(
t−2∑
k=0
λk(γ(t− k − 1))2
)
≤
∑t−2
k=0 λ
kγ(t− k − 1)
1− λ
where the second inequality results from the fact γ(t) ≤ 1. Above two inequalities lead to the validity of (ii).
(iii) Let θi(t) =
[
(1 − γ2(t))∑j∈Ni aijyj(t) + γ(t)gi(xi(t))
]
+
−∑j∈Ni aijyj(t), note that ∑j∈Ni aijyj(t) ∈ Rr+, thus,
‖θi(t)‖ ≤
∥∥∥∥∥∥−γ(t)
∑
j∈Ni
aijγ(t)yj(t) + γ(t)gi(xi(t))
∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤ γ(t)
∑
j∈Ni
aij ‖γ(t)yj(t)‖ + γ(t) ‖gi(xi(t))‖
≤ (√n+ 1)κ2γ(t)
(26)
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where the first inequality results from the non-expansive property of projection, and the third inequality holds by using Lemma
1. By the third equation in (11), we have
yi(t+ 1) =
∑
j∈Ni
aijyj(t) + θi(t) i ∈ V
Define y = [yT1 , · · · , yTn ]T and Y = y − (1n ⊗ Ir)y¯, we have
Y (t+ 1) = (A⊗ Ir)Y (t) + θ(t) (27)
where θ(t) =
((
I − 11Tn
)
⊗ Ir
)
[θ1(t), · · · , θn(t)]T . Since A is symmetric for G(A) being undirected, there must exist an
orthogonal matrix Q =
[
1n√
n
, Q0
]
such that QTLQ = diag(1, λ2(A), · · · , λn(A)). Define Y˜ (t) = (QT ⊗Ir)Y (t), it is obvious
that Y˜ (0) = 0. By (27), it follows
Y˜ (t+ 1) = diag(1, λ2(A)Ir , · · · , λn(A)Ir)Y˜ (t) + (QT ⊗ Ir)θ(t).
Then, together with the facts that ‖Q‖ = 1 and ‖I − 11T /n‖ ≤ 2, we have
‖y − (1n ⊗ Ir)y¯‖ = ‖QY˜ (t)‖
≤ ‖Y˜ (t)‖
≤
t−2∑
k=0
(σ2(A))
k‖θ(t− 1− k)‖
(28)
By (26), we have ‖θ(t− 1− k)‖ ≤ 2(n+√n)κ2γ(t− 1− k). Submitting it into (28) yields inequality in (iii).
(iv) Similar to the proof of (ii), using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, the validity of (iv) can be verified. 
C. Proof of Lemma 3
Note that by algorithm (11), yi(t) and xi(t) will stay in R
r
+ and ∈ Ωi all the time, respectively. Note that
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t+ 1)− x∗i (t+ 1)‖2
=
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t+ 1)− x∗i (t)‖2 +
n∑
i=1
〈x∗i (t+ 1) + x∗i (t)
− 2xi(t+ 1), x∗i (t+ 1)− x∗i (t)〉
≤
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t+ 1)− x∗i (t)‖2 + 4κ1
n∑
i=1
‖x∗i (t+ 1)− x∗i (t)‖.
(29)
Moreover, by the second equation in algorithm (11), we have
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t+ 1)− x∗i (t)‖2 =
n∑
i=1
∥∥∥(1− γ(t))(xi(t)− x∗i (t)) + γ(t)(PΩi [xi(t)
− γ(t)(∇xiJ ti (xi(t)) + γ(t)∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t))] − x∗i (t)
)∥∥∥2
(30)
where ∇xigi(xi(t)) = [∇xigi1(xi(t)), · · · , ∇xigir(xi(t))]. By (4), we have x∗i (t) = PΩi [x∗i (t) − γ(t)(∇xiJ ti (x∗(t)) +
γ(t)∇xigi(x∗i (t))y∗(t))]. Then, from (30), it implies that
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t+ 1)− x∗i (t)‖2 =
n∑
i=1
∥∥∥(1− γ(t))(xi(t)− x∗i (t)) + γ(t)(PΩi [xi(t)
− γ(t)(∇xiJ ti (xi(t)) + γ(t)∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t))]− PΩi [x∗i (t)
− γ(t)(∇xiJ ti (x∗(t)) + γ(t)∇xigi(x∗i (t))y∗(t))]
)∥∥∥2.
(31)
By Jensen’s inequality, we know that ‖γu+(1−γ)v‖2 ≤ γ‖x‖2+(1−γ)‖y‖2 for any 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and any vectors u, v ∈ Rm.
From (31), it follows that
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t+ 1)− x∗i (t)‖2 ≤ (1− γ(t))
n∑
i=1
∥∥∥(xi(t)− x∗i (t))∥∥∥2 + γ(t)
n∑
i=1
∥∥∥PΩi [xi(t)
− γ(t)(∇xiJ ti (xi(t)) + γ(t)∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t))]− PΩi [x∗i (t)
− γ(t)(∇xiJ ti (x∗(t)) + γ(t)∇xigi(x∗i (t))y∗(t))]
∥∥∥2.
(32)
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Using the non-expansive property of projection, one knows that ‖PΩi [u]− PΩi [v]‖ ≤ ‖u− v‖. Hence,∥∥∥PΩi [xi(t)− γ(t)(∇xiJ ti (xi(t)) + γ(t)∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t))]
− PΩi [x∗i (t)− γ(t)(∇xiJ ti (x∗(t)) + γ(t)∇xigi(x∗i (t))y∗(t))]
∥∥∥2
≤
∥∥∥(xi(t)− x∗i (t)) − γ(t) (∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))) − γ2(t) (∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t)−∇xigi(x∗i (t))y∗(t)) ∥∥∥2
= ‖xi(t)− x∗i (t)‖2 + γ2(t)‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))‖2 + γ4(t)‖∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t)−∇xigi(x∗i (t))y∗(t)‖2
− 2γ(t)〈xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))〉
− 2γ2(t)〈xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t)−∇xigi(x∗i (t))y∗(t)〉
+ 2γ3(t)〈∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x∗(t)),∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t)−∇xigi(x∗i (t))y∗(t)〉.
(33)
By the fact that ‖u+ v‖2 ≤ 2(‖u‖2 + ‖v‖2), we have
γ4(t)‖∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t)−∇xigi(x∗i (t))y∗(t)‖2
≤ 2γ4(t)‖∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t)‖2 + 2γ4(t)‖∇xigi(x∗i (t))y∗(t)‖2
≤ 2γ4(t)‖∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t)‖2 + 2γ2(t)‖∇xigi(x∗i (t))y∗(t)‖2
≤ 2γ2‖∇xigi(xi(t))‖2‖γ(t)yi(t)‖2 + 2γ2(t)‖∇xigi(x∗i (t))‖‖y∗(t)‖2
≤ 2γ2(t)κ20‖γ(t)yi(t)‖2 + 2θ2κ20γ2(t)
where the second inequality results from the fact that 0 ≤ γ(t) ≤ 1. Note that
2γ3(t)〈∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x∗(t)),∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t)−∇xigi(x∗i (t))y∗(t)〉
≤ 2γ2(t)‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))‖
(
‖∇xigi(xi(t))‖‖γ(t)yi(t)‖+ γ(t)‖∇xigi(x∗i (t))‖y∗(t)‖
)
≤ 2γ2(t)‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))‖
(
κ0θ + κ0‖y∗(t)‖
)
= 2κ0γ
2(t)‖ (∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x(t))) + (∇xiJ ti (x(t)) −∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))) ‖(‖γ(t)yi(t)‖+ θ)
≤ 2κ0γ2(t)(‖γ(t)yi(t)‖+ θ)‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖+
2κ0γ
2(t)
(
‖∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖ + ‖∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))‖
)(
‖γ(t)yi(t)‖+ θ
)
≤ 2κ0γ2(t)
(
‖γ(t)yi(t)‖ + θ
)
‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖ + 4κ0κ3γ2(t)
(
‖γ(t)yi(t)‖ + θ
)
≤ κ0γ2(t)(‖γ(t)yi(t)‖ + θ)2 + κ0γ2(t)‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t)) −∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖2 + 4κ0κ3γ2(t)
(
‖γ(t)yi(t)‖+ θ
)
where the last inequality holds by using the fact that 2ab ≤ a2+b2 for any a, b ∈ R. Due to the facts that x(t) = (xi(t), x−i(t))
and x(t), x∗(t) ∈ Ω, there holds ‖∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖ ≤ κ3 and ‖∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))‖ ≤ κ3. Then, we have
‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))‖2
= ‖ (∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x(t))) + (∇xiJ ti (x(t)) −∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))) ‖2
≤ ‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖2 + ‖∇xiJ ti (x(t)) −∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))‖2
+ 2‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖‖∇xiJ ti (x(t)) −∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))‖
≤ ‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖2 + 2‖∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖2 + 2‖∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))‖2
+ 2‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖(‖∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖ + ‖∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))‖)
≤ ‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖2 + 4κ3‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t)) −∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖ + 4κ23
and
− 〈xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))〉
= −〈xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xiJ ti (x(t)) −∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))〉 − 〈xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x(t))〉
≤ −〈xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xiJ ti (x(t)) −∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))〉+ ‖xi(t)− x∗i (t)‖‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t)) −∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖
≤ −〈xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xiJ ti (x(t)) −∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))〉+ (‖xi(t)‖ + ‖x∗i (t)‖)‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖
≤ −〈xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xiJ ti (x(t)) −∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))〉+ 2κ1‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖.
12
Then, by inequality (33), it implies that∥∥∥PΩi [xi(t)− γ(t)(∇xiJ ti (xi(t)) + γ(t)∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t))]−
PΩi [x
∗
i (t)− γ(t)(∇xiJ ti (x∗(t)) + γ(t)∇xigi(x∗i (t))y∗(t))]
∥∥∥2
≤ ‖xi(t)− x∗i (t)‖2 + γ2(t)
(
‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t)) −∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖2
+ 4κ3‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖ + 4κ23
)
+ 2γ2(t)κ20‖γ(t)yi(t)‖2 + 2θ2κ20γ2(t)
− 2γ(t)
(
〈xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xiJ ti (x(t)) −∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))〉+ 2κ1‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t)) −∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖
)
+ κ0γ
2(t)(‖γ(t)yi(t)‖+ θ)2 + κ0γ2(t)‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t)) −∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖2
+ 4κ0κ3γ
2(t)
(
‖γ(t)yi(t)‖ + θ
)
− 2γ2(t)〈xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t)−∇xigi(x∗i (t))y∗(t)〉
= ‖xi(t)− x∗i (t)‖2 + γ2(t)
(
(1 + κ0)‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖2
+ 4(κ1 + κ3)‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖
)
+ 2γ2(t)κ20‖γ(t)yi(t)‖2 +
(
2θ2κ20 + 4κ
2
3 + 4κ0κ3θ
)
γ2(t)
− 2γ(t)
〈
xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xiJ ti (x(t)) −∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))
〉
+ κ0γ
2(t)(‖γ(t)yi(t)‖+ θ)2
+ 4κ0κ3γ
2(t)‖γ(t)yi(t)‖ − 2γ2(t)〈xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t)−∇xigi(x∗i (t))y∗(t)〉.
(34)
It is noticed that
− 〈xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t)−∇xigi(x∗i (t))y∗(t)〉
= −〈xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t)〉+ 〈xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xigi(x∗i (t))y∗(t)〉
≤ −〈xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t)〉+ ‖xi(t)− x∗i (t)‖‖∇xigi(x∗i (t))‖y∗(t)‖
≤ −〈xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t)〉+ 2θκ1κ3.
(35)
Based on (34) and (35), it follows that∥∥∥PΩi [xi(t)− γ(t)(∇xiJ ti (xi(t)) + γ(t)∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t))]
− PΩi [x∗i (t)− γ(t)(∇xiJ ti (x∗(t)) + γ(t)∇xigi(x∗i (t))y∗(t))]
∥∥∥2
≤ ‖xi(t)− x∗i (t)‖2 + γ2(t)
(
(1 + κ0)‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖2
+ 4(κ1 + κ3)‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖
)
+ 2γ2(t)κ20‖γ(t)yi(t)‖2 +
(
2θ2κ20 + 4κ
2
3 + 4κ0κ3θ + 4θκ1κ3
)
γ2(t)
− 2γ(t)
〈
xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xiJ ti (x(t)) −∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))
〉
+ κ0γ
2(t)(‖γ(t)yi(t)‖ + θ)2 + 4κ0κ3γ2(t)‖γ(t)yi(t)‖
− 2γ2(t)
〈
xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t)
〉
.
(36)
It is not difficult to verify that τ = 4nκ0θ(θκ0 + κ1 + κ3) + 4nκ
2
3 ≥ 2θ2κ20 + 4κ23 + 4κ0κ3θ + 4θκ1κ3, submitting (36) into
(32) and using the fact that
∑n
i=1
〈
xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xiJ ti (x(t))−∇xiJ ti (x∗(t))
〉
=
〈
x(t)− x∗(t), F t(x(t))−F t(x∗(t))
〉
, we
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have
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t+ 1)− x∗i (t)‖2 ≤
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t)− x∗i (t)‖2 + 2γ3(t)κ20
n∑
i=1
‖γ(t)yi(t)‖2
+ κ0γ
3(t)
n∑
i=1
(θ + ‖γ(t)yi(t)‖)2 + τγ3(t)
− 2γ2(t)〈x(t) − x∗(t), F t(x(t)) − F t(x∗(t))〉
+ (1 + κ0)γ
2(t)
n∑
i=1
‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t)) −∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖2
+ 4(κ1 + κ3)γ
2(t)
n∑
i=1
‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t)) −∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖
− 2γ3(t)
n∑
i=1
〈xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t)〉 + 4κ0κ3γ3(t)
n∑
i=1
‖γ(t)yi(t)‖.
(37)
By condition (i) in Assumption 2, we have
〈x(t) − x∗(t), F t(x(t)) − F t(x∗(t))〉 ≥ µ‖x(t)− x∗(t)‖2.
By condition (ii) in Assumption 2, it yields that
n∑
i=1
‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t))−∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖ ≤ ℓ
n∑
i=1
‖x−i(t)− x−i(t)‖
= ℓ
√√√√( n∑
i=1
‖x−i(t)− x−i(t)‖
)2
≤ ℓ
√√√√n n∑
i=1
‖x−i(t)− x−i(t)‖2
= ℓ
√√√√(n− 1) n∑
i=1
‖ei(t)‖2
≤ ℓ√n− 1
n∑
i=1
‖ei(t)‖
and
n∑
i=1
‖∇xiJ ti (xi(t)) −∇xiJ ti (x(t))‖2 ≤ ℓ2
n∑
i=1
‖ei(t)‖2.
By Lemma 1, one has ‖γ(t)yi(t)‖ ≤ √nκ2. Then, from (37), it follows that
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t+ 1)− x∗i (t)‖2 ≤
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t)− x∗i (t)‖2 + (τ + 2κ20n2κ22 + 4κ0κ3n
√
nκ2 + κ0n(θ +
√
nκ2)
2)γ3(t)
− 2µγ2(t)‖x(t) − x∗(t)‖2 + (1 + κ0)ℓ2γ2(t)
n∑
i=1
‖ei(t)‖2
+ 4
√
n− 1(κ1 + κ3)ℓγ2(t)
n∑
i=1
‖ei(t)‖ − 2γ3(t)
n∑
i=1
〈xi(t)− x∗i (t),∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t)〉.
By definitions of πi, i = 1, 2, we have
2π1 = τ + 2n
2(κ20 + κ0)κ
2
2 + 4κ0κ3κ2n
√
n+ 2nκ0θ
2 ≥ τ + 2κ20n2κ22 + 4κ0κ2κ3n
√
n+ κ0n(θ +
√
nκ2)
2
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and 2π2 = 4
√
n− 1ℓ(κ1 + κ3). Thus,
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t+ 1)− x∗i (t)‖2
≤
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t)− x∗i (t)‖2 + 2π1γ3(t)− 2γ2(t)µ‖x(t)
− x∗(t)‖2 + (1 + κ0)ℓ2γ2(t)
n∑
i=1
‖ei(t)‖2
+ 2π2γ
2(t)
n∑
i=1
‖ei(t)‖ − 2γ3(t)
n∑
i=1
〈xi(t)
− x∗i (t),∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t)〉.
(38)
The convexity of gi(xi(t))yi(t) with respect to xi implies that
n∑
i=1
〈xi(t)− x∗i ,∇xigi(xi(t))yi(t)〉
≥
n∑
i=1
(gi(xi(t)))
T yi(t)−
n∑
i=1
(gi(x
∗
i (t)))
T (yi(t)
− y¯(t))−
n∑
i=1
(gi(x
∗
i (t)))
T y¯(t)
≥
n∑
i=1
(gi(xi(t)))
T yi(t)− κ2
n∑
i=1
‖yi(t)− y¯(t)‖
(39)
where the second inequality holds due to the facts that
∑n
i=1 gi(x
∗
i ) ≤ 0 and y¯(t) ≥ 0. Submitting (38) and (39) into (29),
and taking the summation with respect to t = 1, · · · , T , we have
T∑
t=1
‖x(t)− x∗(t)‖2
≤
T∑
t=1
1
2µγ2(t)
( n∑
i=1
‖xi(t)− x∗i (t)‖2 −
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t+ 1)
− x∗i (t+ 1)‖2
)
+
π1
µ
T∑
t=1
γ(t) +
(1 + κ0)ℓ
2
2µ
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
‖ei(t)‖2
+
π2
µ
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
‖ei(t)‖ − 1
µ
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
γ(t)(gi(xi(t)))
T yi(t)
+
2κ1
µγ2(T )
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
‖x∗i (t+ 1)− x∗i (t)‖ +
κ2
µ
n∑
i=1
‖yi(t)− y¯(t)‖.
Note that ‖xi(t)− x∗i (t)‖2 ≤ 4κ21 for any i ∈ V , therefore,
T∑
t=1
1
2γ2(t)
( n∑
i=1
‖xi(t)− x∗i (t)‖2 −
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t+ 1)− x∗i (t+ 1)‖2
)
=
1
2γ2(1)
n∑
i=1
‖xi(1)− x∗i (1)‖2 −
1
2γ2(T )
n∑
i=1
‖xi(T + 1)
− x∗i (T + 1)‖2 +
1
2
T∑
t=2
( 1
γ2(t)
− 1
γ2(t− 1)
) n∑
i=1
‖xi(t)− x∗i (t)‖2
≤ 2nκ
2
1
γ2(T )
.
Using above two inequalities and the fact that
∑T
t=1
∑n
i=1 ‖x∗i (t + 1) − x∗i (t)‖ ≤
√
nΘT leads to the validity of inequality
(16). 
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D. Proof of Lemma 4
By the third equation in (11), the following recursion for Lagrange multipliers holds
n∑
i=1
‖yi(t+ 1)− y‖2
=
n∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥∥∥

(1 − γ2(t)) ∑
j∈Ni
aijyj(t) + γ(t)gi(xi(t))


+
− y
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
n∑
i=1
∥∥∥(1− γ2(t)) ∑
j∈Ni
aij(yj(t)− yi(t)) + (yi(t)− y) + γ(t)(gi(xi(t))− γ(t)yi(t))
∥∥∥2
≤
n∑
i=1
( ∑
j∈Ni
aij‖yj(t)− yi(t)‖2 + ‖yi(t)− y‖2
+ γ2(t)‖gi(xi(t))− γ(t)yi(t)‖2 + 2(1− γ2(t))
∑
j∈Ni
aij〈yj(t)− yi(t), yi(t)
− y〉+ 2γ(t)
∑
j∈Ni
aij‖yj(t)− yi(t)‖‖gi(xi(t)) − γ(t)yi(t)‖ + 2γ(t)〈yi(t)− y, gi(xi(t))− γ(t)yi(t)〉
)
(40)
where the first inequality results from the non-expansive property of projection, and the second inequality holds by using
Jensen’s inequality and the fact that γ(t) < 1. Moreover,
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aij〈yj(t)− yi(t), yi(t)− y〉
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aij〈yj(t)− yi(t), yi(t)− y¯(t)〉
≤ 1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aij(‖yj(t)− yi(t)‖2 + ‖yi(t)− y¯(t)‖2)
(41)
where the equation holds due to the fact that
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 aij〈yj(t) −yi(t), z〉 = 0 for any z ∈ Rr, and the inequality holds
by using Young’s inequality. Using (a− b)2 ≤ 2(a2 + b2), we have
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aij(‖yj(t)− yi(t)‖2) ≤ 4
n∑
i=1
(‖yi(t)− y¯(t)‖2) (42)
It is noticed that
〈yi(t)− y, gi(xi(t))− γ(t)yi(t)〉 ≤ 〈gi(xi(t)), yi(t)− y〉+ γ(t)(‖y‖
2 − ‖yi(t)‖2
2
(43)
Using Lemma 1, we know that ‖gi(xi(t)) − γ(t)yi(t)‖ ≤ κ2 + √nκ2 and ‖gi(xi(t)) − γ(t)yi(t)‖2 ≤ 2κ22 + 2nκ22. Using
inequalities (40)-(43) and taking the summation with respect to t = 1, · · · , T , we have
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
γ(t)
(
(gi(xi(t)))
T yi(t)− (gi(xi(t)))T y + γ(t)‖y‖
2
2
)
≥
T∑
t=1
1
2
(
n∑
i=1
‖yi(t+ 1)− y‖2 −
n∑
i=1
‖yi(t)− y‖2
)
−
T∑
t=1
9
2
n∑
i=1
‖yi(t)− y¯(t)‖2 − nκ22(1 + n)
T∑
t=1
γ2(t)
− κ2(1 +
√
n)
T∑
t=1
γ(t)
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aij‖yj(t)− yi(t)‖.
(44)
Note that yi(1) = 0, then
T∑
t=1
(‖yi(t+ 1)− y‖2 − ‖yi(t)− y‖2) ≥ −‖y‖2. (45)
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By (44) and (45), together with the facts that
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 aij‖yj(t)− yi(t)‖ ≤ 2
∑n
i=1 ‖yi(t)− y¯(t)‖ and γ(t) ≤ 1, it implies
inequality (17). 
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